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Mittwoch, 9. März 2022

Sanctions, Boycotts, Bans - Cancel culture as reaction to #PutinsWar?

Week 2 of  Putin's senseless War against Ukraine has come to an end and we are witnessing already the start of the third week of a war which noone wanted to have, despite Mr.Putin and his political apparatus. 

However, economic sanctions will be felt not only by Mr.Putin and his puppets, they will hit eventually the population, the first ones are already to be felt. No facebook, no twitter, no MacDonalds...Discussions are in full swing everywhere as to which extent Russian culture too will have to be avoided, excluded or even cancelled.....

 

NYTimes.com/Opinion

March 9, 2022


 Russian-German pianist Igor Levit, left, and Russian sopranoa Anna Netrebko.Illustration by The New York Times; Photography by Stefanie Loos, Angelos Tzortzinis and mikroman6 via Getty Images

 

Author Headshot

By Spencer Bokat-Lindell

Staff Editor, Opinion

A specter is haunting Russia — the specter of cancellation.

As Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine enters its third week, conscientious consumers and businesses across the West have retaliated through what can be described only as a mass cultural boycott.

In Russia, Disney and Warner Bros. have paused theatrical releases, and McDonald’s, Starbucks and Coca-Cola have suspended their business operations. In the United States, liquor stores and supermarkets have pulled Russian vodka from their shelves, and the Metropolitan Opera cut ties with one of its most acclaimed sopranos after she criticized the war but refused to distance herself from Putin. And in the international arena, Eurovision, FIFA and the Paralympic Games have banned Russians from participating in this year’s competitions.

Are these informal sanctions of Russian culture and business justified, and can they alter the course of the war? Or are these histrionic gestures that risk stigmatizing an entire population for the crimes of one autocrat? And what does the invocation of “cancel culture” — as both a rhetorical cliché and a material phenomenon — reveal about the way the war is being metabolized through social media? Here’s what people are saying.

The case for cancellation

About a century ago, sanctions emerged on the world stage as an alternative to conventional warfare, an “economic weapon” intended to impose such a high burden on a country’s political elite that it would be forced to change its behavior. While conceived as a tool to be wielded by nation-states against other nation-states, they can also be levied — however haphazardly — by nonstate actors against other nonstate actors, as we’re now seeing.

In the arts, Javier C. Hernández reports for The Times, organizations are facing pressure from donors, board members, audiences and social media users to fire Russian artists who do not distance themselves from Putin or fail to speak out with sufficient fervor against the war. Such campaigns are not unprecedented, as some commentators have pointed out.

But vetting artists for their political beliefs and ties raises difficult questions. “What is the point at which cultural exchange — always a blur between being a humanizing balm and a tool of propaganda, a co-opting of music’s supposed neutrality — becomes unbearable?” asks Zachary Woolfe, The Times’s classical music editor. “What is sufficient distance from authoritarian leadership? And what is sufficient disavowal, particularly in a context when speaking up could threaten the safety of artists or their families?”

For the Russian-born pianist Igor Levit, the issue isn’t so complicated. “Being a musician does not free you from being a citizen, from taking responsibility,” he commented on his Instagram account, adding the #StandWithUkraine hashtag. “Remaining vague when one man, especially the man who is the leader of your home country, starts a war against another country and by doing so also causes greatest suffering to your home country and your people is unacceptable.”

Others have argued that athletics are the better cultural theater in which to wage war against Putin. “Sanctions against Putin in the sphere of games have a reach unlike any other because they leave him sweatingly exposed to the only audience he really fears or courts: the Russians in the street,” Sally Jenkins argues in The Washington Post. “His brand of shirtless belligerent patriotism — his macho nationalism — has been a long con, and it’s no small thing to knock him off medal podiums and expose the lifts in his shoes, or to rip off his judo belt and show the softening of his belly and, in turn, weaken his influence.”

So far, the cultural backlash doesn’t seem to have done much to get Putin to change course — and may even be playing into his preferred narrative of Russia being victimized by the West.

Yet the longer the country’s cultural isolation persists, “the more chance such measures have of breaking through the state’s narrative,” Yasmeen Serhan writes for The Atlantic. “If ordinary Russians can no longer enjoy many of the activities they love, including things as quotidian as watching their soccer teams play in international matches, seeing the latest films, and enjoying live concerts, their tolerance for their government’s isolationist policies will diminish.”

The risk of a new Russophobia

When holding a country’s people responsible for the transgressions of its political system, how do you decide whom it’s fair to punish? In Russia’s case, the economist Tyler Cowen argues that you can’t.

“It is simply not possible to draw fair or accurate lines of demarcation,” he writes in Bloomberg. “What about performers who may have favored Putin in the more benign times of 2003 and now are skeptical, but have family members still living in Russia? Do they have to speak out?”

Another question: “Who exactly counts as Russian? Ethnic Russians? Russian citizens? Former citizens? Ethnic Russians born in Ukraine?”

Tricky moral calculus aside, the utility of these informal sanctions is still very much in doubt. “None of these measures will reduce the Ukraine war’s life span by a minute, let alone a day,” Jack Schafer argues in Politico. “It would be a mistake to even proclaim these gestures symbolic because they don’t really symbolize anything meaningful about the war,” he adds, noting that only about 1.5 percent of all vodka consumed in the United States comes from Russia.

At worst, critics warn that these cancellation campaigns directed at ordinary Russians could backfire. “Contrary to expectations, making life harder for the population can bind them to the rulers who blame outside interference,” writes Samuel Goldman, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University. “Even when sanctions succeed in destabilizing the regimes they target, new dictators may come to power under conditions of economic collapse and social disorder.”

A potential rise in anti-Russian bigotry is another concern. Already in the West, The Washington Post reports, people of Russian descent or association are reporting a rise in discriminatory attacks, comments and refusals of service from local businesses. In New York City, some Russian restaurants have seen a decline in customers.

What might a more targeted informal sanctions regime look like? In Mondoweiss, Jonathan Ofir, an Israeli-born musician, suggests looking to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, which calls — controversially, to be sure — for an end to the Israeli government’s occupation of Palestinian land captured in 1967, among other demands. The B.D.S. movement claims to reject on principle boycotts based on individuals’ identities, opinions or mere affiliation with Israeli cultural institutions. Rather, only those who represent the State of Israel or participate in Israel’s efforts to “rebrand” its occupation are targeted for sanctions.

Insofar as measures are being taken against Russians with no apparent ties to their leader, “the B.D.S. movement takes a softer boycott than what was applied to apartheid South Africa, and than the one now readily applied to Russia,” Ofir says.

When it comes to Russian goods, though, the biggest pressure point is fossil fuels, which are not within the average person’s ability to boycott. President Biden did take the striking step on Tuesday of banning imports of Russian oil and natural gas. But Europe, which is much more dependent on Russian energy, has not yet demonstrated the same resolve, and continues to pay Russia hundreds of millions of dollars every day for fuel.

From culture war to actual war

As Kyle Chayka writes for The New Yorker, the invasion of Ukraine is by no means the first conflict to play out over social media. But it is perhaps the first war to be mediated primarily by content creators and live-streamers rather than by traditional news organizations.

As people and institutions watch the war get spun into content in real time, they react to it as social media has trained them to: through arguably superficial displays of solidarity, entreaties to practice self-care, the reflexive lionization of political figures, Twitter clapbacks (in one case, between the Russian and German Embassies in South Africa), and a desperate desire to be — or at least appear — useful.

The cancellation of Russian cultural figures and products can be understood as a successive step in this familiar choreography. “This is the globalization of moral outrage,” the Times columnist Thomas Friedman writes. “It goes from watching a short video online showing Russian soldiers firing on a Ukrainian nuclear energy facility to an employee posting that video on his or her Facebook page to a group of employees emailing their bosses or going on Slack — not to ask their C.E.O.s to do something but to tell them they have to do something or they will lose workers and customers.”

This decentralized response — “a kind of global ad hoc pro-Ukraine-resistance-solidarity-movement,” as Friedman calls it — is arguably quite inspiring. But there’s a danger to it too, Friedman warns: While nation-states may choose to lift their sanctions at some point for realpolitik reasons, everyone else may not.

“When Anonymous, the global hacker consortium, announced that it was attempting to take down Russian websites, that was not by government order; it just acted on its own,” he writes. “Who does Russia call to get Anonymous to accept a cease-fire?”

 

READ MORE

“To Boycott Russians, or Not? In Film and Beyond, That’s the Question.” [The New York Times]

 

Related Debates:

- War/03.03.2022

- War on the horizon???/04.02.2022 

 

#PutinsWar 

 #StandingWithUkraine

 

 

Freitag, 4. Februar 2022

War on the horizon???

 

28.01.2022 - De Volkskrant, source

This was today in my Inbox as I have subscribed to the New York Times newsletter. This edition is about the conflict concerning Ukraine and Russia and the role of the US and European countries...Although I hate to bring this topic here in my blog, I think it deserves debate and knowledge.

My position is clear - war has to be avoided at all costs and the West should not play this power game in the name of protecting the Ukraine, seeing all the military preparations going on makes me sick to the core...



 NYTimes.com/Opinion

“This is not going to be a war of Ukraine and Russia. This is going to be a European war, a full-fledged war.”

Those, in the words of President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, are the stakes of the crisis that has enveloped his country, now the site of the worst diplomatic dispute between Russia and the West in decades. Over recent months, Russia has massed about 130,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders, prompting fears of a full-scale invasion.

President Biden responded to the escalation this week by ordering about 3,000 additional troops into Eastern Europe, but has stressed that war is not inevitable. “If Russia is sincere about addressing our respective security concerns through dialogue, the United States and our allies and partners will continue to engage in good faith,” he said on Monday.

How should the Biden administration go about defusing the conflict, and what consequences, if any, should it impose on Russia if it fails? Here’s what people are saying.

Wait, how did we get here?

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine won its sovereignty from Russia in exchange for dismantling its nuclear arsenal, and for decades the country aligned itself with neither Russia nor the West. In 2008, however, Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yushchenko, sought membership in NATO, earning strong public support from President George W. Bush.

Russia saw this development as an act of aggression. “Were Ukraine to join NATO, the alliance would then have a 1,200-mile land border with Russia, a situation no major power would abide, no matter how loudly the Atlantic alliance claims to be purely defensive,” The Times editorial board explained.

The situation escalated in 2014, when Yushchenko’s more Russia-friendly successor was overthrown amid widespread protests.

In recent weeks, President Vladimir Putin formally demanded that Ukraine never join NATO and that the organization withdraw troops and nuclear weapons from former Soviet countries. “The immediate aim, to be sure, is to return Ukraine to Russia’s orbit,” Lilia Shevtsova writes in The Times. But “Putin’s design is grand: to refashion the post-Cold War settlement, in the process guaranteeing the survival of Russia’s personalized power system.”

 Would Russia actually invade?

Some analysts and politicians doubt it. The Russian government has said repeatedly that it has no plans to launch an attack — and restraint might actually be in its best interests.

“Europeans and Ukrainians believe that a hybrid strategy — involving military presence on the border, weaponization of energy flows and cyberattacks — will serve him better” than a hot war, Ivan Krastev, a political scientist, writes in The Times. “By hardening the conflict, Mr. Putin could cohere his opponents. Holding back, by contrast, could have the opposite effect: The policy of maximum pressure, short of an invasion, may end up dividing and paralyzing NATO.”

The case for ‘peace through strength’

To some commentators, the United States has a moral imperative to do everything it can, short of mounting a ground war in Ukraine, to combat Russian aggression — and not just because Biden made a campaign promise to “hold the Putin regime accountable” for its crimes.

“Weakness makes conflicts more likely, not less likely,” Jim Geraghty argues in National Review. “If Putin concludes the U.S. and NATO isn’t really willing to strain itself to defend applicant country Ukraine, he might conclude the U.S. and other NATO states like Germany wouldn’t really come to the aid of member states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.”

A more aggressive response would also serve the interests of the Ukrainian people, Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s foreign affairs minister, has argued. In a December Foreign Affairs piece, he called on the Biden administration to take three steps to safeguard Ukraine’s independence:

  • Make it plain to Russia that Ukraine is a future member of both the European Union and NATO and that its sovereignty is nonnegotiable.
  • Prepare to enact sanctions in the worst-case scenario of an invasion.
  • Provide more military assistance to Ukraine, including ammunition and air and missile defenses.

“Ukraine’s goal is simple: peace through strength,” he wrote. “For now, the United States and its European allies should talk to Putin to win time while strengthening Ukraine to the extent that Russia will simply have no feasible military option for invading it.”

Is there room for diplomacy in such a strategy? The Times columnist Bret Stephens doesn’t think so. “We should break off talks with Russia now: No country ought to expect diplomatic rewards from Washington while it threatens the destruction of our friends,” he writes. “Biden needs to stand tough on Ukraine in order to save NATO.”

The case for military restraint

As Fiona Harrigan points out in Reason, one immediate objection to U.S. military intervention is the absence of a popular mandate for it. “While the president is authorized under the Constitution to direct the U.S. Armed Forces, he can only do so following a congressional declaration of war,” she notes.

But it’s also not clear whether military aid would prove an effective deterrent. If Putin is indeed committed to invading Ukraine, Samuel Charap and Scott Boston of the RAND Corporation argue that he “is unlikely to be deterred by whatever U.S. military assistance can be delivered in the coming weeks.” They are not alone in that analysis.

In the view of Stephen Wertheim and Joshua Shifrinson, the Biden administration should instead pursue a diplomatic approach that supports Ukraine’s independence, but does not seek to tether it to the West through NATO. “Do Americans really wish to risk war with other great powers, near those countries’ borders and over issues of questionable importance to America’s security and prosperity?” they wrote in The Washington Post in December. “If the answer is no, the United States should halt the expansionist drift of its post-Cold War policies.”

If diplomacy fails, economic sanctions are another option with broad support among foreign policy experts. A survey of 362 international relations scholars found that nearly 90 percent of respondents would support their use in the event of an invasion.

With sanctions, however, the administration would face a difficult balance to strike between maximizing pressure on the Russian government and minimizing the suffering for ordinary Russian citizens (as well as for Europeans, who depend on Russian natural gas). Putin’s wealth is well concealed and difficult to target; more broad-based assaults on Russia’s financial system could raise prices of food and clothing, or, worse, cause a market crash that decimates pensions and savings accounts.

For now, the White House is reportedly preparing sanctions on oligarchs who are “in or near the inner circle of the Kremlin.” Bill Browder, once the largest foreign investor in Russia, believes this is the right idea: “If you ask any Russian dissident or opposition politician what would stop Putin, they would all point toward this strategy,” he writes for Time.

In the longer term, the Biden administration could try to broker a compromise called the Minsk II agreement. Initially proposed between Russia and Ukraine in 2015, it won the support of the European Union and the United Nations but was never implemented. On the one hand, the agreement would guarantee an independent Ukraine with Russian forces removed and separatists disarmed; on the other, it would promise full autonomy for the Donbas region and an end to Ukraine’s NATO ambitions.

“A new round of ‘Minsk talks’ will be held in Berlin in the second week of February,” Katrina vanden Heuvel notes in The Washington Post. “As we confront the worst U.S.-Russian confrontation in decades, isn’t it time for the United States to join with its allies to revive a path to a settlement that might lead to a stable peace?”

 

 Source:

- New York Times Newsletter